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This paper focuses on some of the military-security developments in 
lhe states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), specifically the range of bilate· 
ral and multilateral relationships among these countries Ihat have emerged 
over the last several years. In examining security developments in this 
region, it is important to begin with an understanding of lhe different 
security perspectives among tbe newly emerged states in the wake of the colla-
pse of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, there were some states that stron-
g1y advocated tbe preservation of some type of a unified military force (and 
who, not surprisingly, were among lhe last to begin establishing their own natio· 
nal armies); foremost among these states were Kazakhstan and Russia. On 
the other hand, countries such as Ukraine and Uzbekistan seized the oppor-
tunity quite soon after they declared themselves independent states to 
start the process of creating national militaries. Indeed, at this point ali 
of tbe fifteeo countries that had previously made up the Soviet Uoion 
(that is, inciuding the Baltic states) have now begun tbis processo Ooe of 
the primary reasoos for tbe decision to create oational armies is Ihat an 
army is viewed as a significant effort to confirm and consolidate one's 
indepeodence as a nation state. 
Still, while each of tbese countries is seeking to establish il own natio-
nal military force, there are certain reasons for continuing cooperation 
among these states. In facI, certain factors occasionaIly even dictate the need 
to develop sueh cooperatioo. The most nolable of these faetors is the 
requirements for an officer corps. Withio the Soviet system, etboie Russialls 
comprised ali overwhelming majority of tbe overall tbe officer corps; the 
second largest group were Ukrainians, while the other Soviet republics 
had oniy a very few officers, particularly at the highest ranks. Hence, 
today virtual1y al1 of tbe new states (except Ukraine) are extremely depen-
dent on Russia for providing many of the officer. to guide the creation of 
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their own militaries. Russia a1so views such on arrangement as beneficiaI: 
in part because Russia lacks the housing and military jobs to offer many 
of these officers, and in part because elose cooperation with the other 
countries can provide opportunities for Russia to shape the way in which 
the new militaries are established, reinforee certain seeurity and defense 
industrial dependeneies, etc, 
Another area in whieh the other states (again, with lhe exception of 
Ukraine) are heavily dependent on Russia is in the availability of training 
faeilitiçs and military sehQOls,given that. some two-thirdsof sueh Soviet 
faeilities were located in Russia. This does not mean, however, that these 
other states have tumed onIy to Russia for training and schooling. For 
example, in the case of some of the Central Asian slales, Turkey has rea-
dily offered such opporlunities, while lhe Ballie slales have lumed parti-
culary lo some of their Weslem neighbors, such as FinIand and Denrnark. 
FinaIly, a third factor eontributing to seeurity cooperation among lhe 
FSU eountries is the issue of defense industrial inlerdependeney among these 
states and the overall limited national eapability for weapons manufaelure. 
Yet again, Russia possessed most of the arms production capacity in the 
Soviet Union, and although virtuaIly every one of the states had some de-
fense industrial production, many did not (and do not) have the independenl 
ability to manufacture a given piece of eombat equipment ar weapon - such 
as a tank ar an aireraft - in its entirety. 
In short, nane of the other countries of the formeI' Soviet Union is 
truly able to provide for its own security wilhout some form of reliance 
on Russia. The onIy possible exeeption to this assemon would be Ukraine, 
and there is some room for doubt aboul whether even Ukraine ean actuaIIy 
do so. 
EXPLORING SECURITY ALTERNATIVES 
What kind of a1tematives, then, have the FSU slales had in Irying to 
pursue security issues and relationships? The first are obviously bilateral 
security arrangements; indeed, virtuaIIy alI of these coulries - with the 
notable exception of the three Baltic slales - have opted to establish vari-
ous leveis of bilateral relations with Russia. It should be noted thal Ukrai-
ne has recently 80ugbl lo beeome more active in this arena, as a competi 101' 
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(or alternative) to Russia in some respects, having recently sent a military 
delegation to several Central Asian states for example, to discuss opportuni-
ties for expanded security cooperation. In addition to bilateral relations 
among the former Soviet states, each of course also has the opportunity 
to expand its contacts with countries beyond these borders, primarily in 
Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the United States. 
The second option for security relationships are multilateral ones, 
which can take several forms. The first of these forms is a multilateral 
relationship within the framework of the CommonweaIth of Independent 
States (CIS), which is addressed in greater detail below. Another form 
of multilateral relations is the attempt by each country to establish con-
tacts with a variety of multilateral institutions, incIuding (but not limited 
to) NATO, the WEU, CSCE, EU, and ECO. However, ali of the FSU 
states have generally found that the altitude of the Western institutions 
toward accepting them and trying to integrate them was much cooler than 
the former had either anticipated ar desired. 
The final alternative is to attempt to establish multilateral cooperative 
clforts on lhe ir own, efforts lhat would incIude several FSU countries but 
also other countries in lhe particular region. It is possible to cite at least 
two examples that fali under this alternative. Among some of the European 
FSU states, there has been discussion of creating a Baltic-to-Black Sea zone, 
which has been advocated above ali by Ukraine anel lo a lesser exlent 
by Lithuania, it would include, for instance: Ukraine, Belams, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Ro· 
mania. Among the problems this particular effort have encountered are: 
Russia has viewed the idea as an attempt lo isolate it from lhe rest of Euro· 
pe and the Central European states have proved reluclant to sign on. 
both because of the possible repercussions in thei,. own relations with 
Russia and beca use of their desire to look more to the West than to lhe 
Easl. The other example of a multilateral effort initiated by an FSU state(s) 
is the one articulated by President Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, 
to crcate essentially an equivalent to the Conference on Securily and Coope-
ration in Europe (CSCE) for Asia, or a «CSCA". Here, too, the levei of 
interest has remained at a fairly low levei and has lo date been confined 
to some general meetings. 
Ali these forms of bilateral and multilateral relationships have becn 
explorcd to varying degrees by the stales of the former Soviet Union, with 
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the greatest emphasis placed on the pursuit of bilateral initiatives. Before 
turning to a more detailed examination of such initiatives, however, I will 
briefly address the main multilateral security effort pursued to date within 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
THE COLLECTlVE SECURITY TREATY 
The most significant effort in the context of multilateral security initia· 
tives within the CIS has been the CoIlective Security Treaty. Initialed in 
May 1992, in Tashkent, at one of the CIS meetings, it was originaIly signed, 
however, by only six member states: Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Taji· 
kistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. It is thus readily evident that the agre· 
ement is largely one between Russia and the Central Asian states (with 
the exception of Turkmenistan). 
Since that time, Belarus has also decided to join the Collective Security 
Treaty. This was not accomplished without some difficulties, nevertheless. 
On one side of the argument was then·Chairman of the Belarusian Parlia· 
ment (the Supreme Soviel), Stanislav Shushkevich, who opposed joining 
the treaty on the grounds that is would violate Belarus' commitments to 
maintaining neutrality and to refusing to participate in military blocs (both 
of which were fundamental components of Belarus' statement of indepen· 
dence). 
Shushkevich found himself oppased by the majority of parliamentarians, 
then'prime minister Kebich, as weIl as the foreign and defense ministers, 
ali of whom were stronger proponents of a cIose relationship with Russia 
and argued that participation in the CoIlective Security Treaty was neces· 
sary because Belarus simply lacks the ability to provide for its own security 
and, perhaps even more importantIy, because it would aIlow Belarus to 
gain econamic henefits from Russia (such as more favorahle prices on fuel 
and other commodities). In the end, Shushkevich was ousted from his 
position and Kehich, as his successor, signed the agreement (albeit with 
limitations placed on any possible participation of Belarusian military per· 
sonnel in CIS peacekeeping efforts, for example). 
In general, based on those who have signed the Collective Security 
Treaty, it is cIear that the Central Asian states have been the ones who 
are most interested in pursuing multilateral cooperation and establishing 
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an effective colIective security arrangement. Given the serious conflict in 
Tajikistan since 1992 and its potential implications for security throughout 
the region, this interest is certainly not suprising. The one exception, as 
noted, is Turkmenistan, which has opted to pursue strictly bilateral security 
relation with Russia. Stil!, the fact remains that the ColIective Security 
Treaty is largely an agreement on paper, with little progress made in the 
form of developing a multilateral staff infrastructure. Certainly one of 
the impediments to such developments is Russia's reluctance to finance 
these efforts, knowing that as difficult as its economic situation is, the other 
former Soviet states are in an even less tenable position to finance such 
security projects. 
BILATERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE FORMER 
SOVIET UNION 
As is already evident from the preceding discussions, virtualIy alI the 
countries of the former Soviet Union have reached bilateral military-security 
agreements with Russia. These agreements have covered, first and foremost, 
the continued service of Russian officers in the other new national, while 
stil! retaining their status as officers in the Russian military, and the provi-
sion of schooling and training at Russian military establislunents for mem-
bers of the other national militaries. In the case of the officer corps ser-
vice, one of the main questions becomes: how long wil! both sides be inte-
rested in preserving this arrangement? 11 appears that for at least some of 
the countries, it could only last until the end of 1994, while for others 
agreements have already been reached to continue the arrangement until 
the tum of the century. 
It is important to note that, as a whole, the bilateral arrangements 
that have been worked between Russia and the other former Soviet states 
do not offer mutual defense commitments. In other words, in the event 
one country is attacked by a third party, the other (most probably Russia) 
is not required to come to the defense of the country lhat was attacked; 
rather, it is committed only to conducting consultations. This provides 
further evidence (in addition to the absence of a colIective security infras-
lructure) that Russia remains somewhat reluctant to shoulder too much of 
an open-ended burden in defense malters that it fears might not nece,sarily 
be in it' direct interest. 
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The desire on lhe part of lhe other countries lo have military-security 
cDoperation with Russia is fairly self-evident, givcn some of their personnel 
and financiaI constraints noted above. Perhaps a more challenging question 
to answer is: what are, in fact, Russia's motivations in reaching these bila-
teral agreements? Part of lhe explanation lies in the fact Ihat Russia cannot 
offer its military officers already living in Russia adequate housing and 
employment opportunities. These difficulties are only compounded by lhe 
need to complete troop wilhdrawals fram Germany and the Baltic states. 
Thus, to the extent Ihat officers can be usefully employed elsewhere in 
the FSU, and still retain the benefits of being a Russian officer, this arran-
gement reduces the demands (and even the potential for instability) on the 
Russian leadership significantly. 
Another motivation for Russia's actions, which may represent a more 
cynical interpretation, is that the Russians are also interested in maintaining 
a certain leveI of military presence in many of the states of the <mear abro-
"d" (FSU). By having agreements to allow Russian officers to serve in these 
countries, lhe ability to maintain Ihis presence is made easier. In fact, ovel' 
the last several months, representatives of both the Russian military and 
political leadership have discusscd the idea of creating as many as thil'ty 
military bases in tl1e former Soviet Union. They recognize lhal such arran-
gements would not be welcome in lhe Baltic slales, nol' would the current 
leadership in Kiev allow such bases to be established in Ukraine (although 
lhe Crhnean leadersrup's attitude to Ihis would be quite different). Where 
lhe Russians have already succeeded is in Georgia: according to a recenl 
bilateral agreement between these lwo countries, Russia will establish aI 
leasl three military bases there. (I! should be noled that this solution was 
eertainly not Eduard Shevardnadze's firsl ehoise: he sought assistance 
from a variely of Western governments and international institulions, but 
in lhe wake of Iheir unwillingness to commil resourees and forces to pre-
serve rus country's integrity, he was foreed to turn to Russia for help. One 
of lhe latter's conditions was the ereation of these bases). 
The existence of a network of military bases in the «near abroad" 
obviously gives Russia lhe potential, should a confliet arise in any of lhese 
arcas, to keep the conflicl furlher away from its own borders. A less bcnign 
intel'pretntion is lhat, if Russia decides to pursue hnperialist ambitions 
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- claiming some of the Soviet Union's formeI' territory for its own - these 
bases will c1early facilitate such efforts. 
AREAS 01' UNREST IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND THE 
PEACEKEEPING MISSION 
For alI its negative consequences, one oI tbe accomplishments of the 
communist system was to keep the manifestation of nationalist sentiments 
under wraps. But, with the advent of President Gorbachev's policy of 
g/asnost, it became possible to express these sentiments more freely. Since 
the first overt manifestations of nationalism in Alma-Ata in Oecember 1986 
(precipitated by Gorbachev's faUure to observe the unwritten rules of sym-
bolic power-sharing between ethnic Russian and the indigenous population), 
this area of the world has witnessed increasing numbers of conflicts and 
civil wars. Today, ethnic tensions are further fueled by socio-economic 
difficulties caused by the collapse of the command economy and the absence 
of a working market economy to replace it. 
A brief examination of current conflicts in the FSU provide an appor-
tunity to view the various types of military-security solutions tbat have 
been trled to date. In the case of the long-term dispute between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, attempts to resolve tbe confronta-
tion have largely been pursued under the auspices of tbe CSCE, although 
therc have been some bilateral medialion attempts as well (for, example, 
by both Russia and Turkey). 
The conflict in Tajikistan, which broke out in mid-1992, has been 
the only example of peacekeeping activities being pursued under the rubric 
of the CIS Collective Security Treaty. Here, Russia has pushed for the 
other Central Asian signatories - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzs-
tan - to contribute to lhe peacekeeping effort. The reasons for this appro-
ach are largely symbolic. In fact, Russia is providing some 90 percent of 
the financing and roughly 20 000 troops dedicated to peacekeeping in Taji-
kistan, the otbe .. th .. ee countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan) 
are supplying less than 1500 men. Still, at a time when Russia's motiva-
tions for its involvement and activities in the FSU are being questioned, the 
value of such symbolism is not to be dismissed. 
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In the case of conflicts in Georgia (both in the regions of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia) as well as in the Dniester region of Moldova, Russia has 
been quite active in pursuing bilateral peacekeeping solutions with the 
given countries. Question about the neutrality of Russian forces partici-
pating as peacekeeping in these areas have legitimately been raised in these 
instances, but in short Georgia and Moldova have found that Russia provides 
effectively the only solution; no other countries appear to be willing to 
become involved in peacekeeping there. 
Finally, Russia has experienced its own instances of domestie conflie! 
and has sent some of its troops into regions of the North Caucasus as peace-
keepers. Indeed, it should be expected that Russia's North Caucasus area 
will be the site of many cases of instability for the foreseeable future, fueled 
both by ethnic tensions and socio-economic difficulties. Anticipation of 
such instability is clearly a primary reason for the Russian leadership's 
decision to base its most mobile forces (eurrent1y being created) in this region; 
Ihese forces will be the ones called upon to serve in peacekeeping roles. 
Peacekeeping is obviously the primary focus for resolving ali of Ihese 
eonflicts, both within particular countries and across whal are now interna· 
tional borders in lhe Former Soviet Union. In that respect, these new states 
are seeking the same solution as most of the rest of the international commu· 
nity: from the former Yugoslavia to Somalia to Rwanda, everyone expects 
peacekeepers to solve the problems. Still the FSU's (and, namely, Russia's) 
approach to peacekeeping differs in 3n important way from other peace-
keeping efforts, for example under the United Nations' auspices, an appro-
ach which has raised Western concerns about these aetivities. Specifi-
ca11y, the main difference is that the peacekeeping forces established in 
each of the areas comprise the belligerent parties. Thus, for example in the 
case of the unrest in Abkhazia in Georgia, the peaeekeeping troops have 
been Georgia, Abkhazian, and Russian. 
One of the apparent reasons for Russia's involvement in peacekeeping 
operations is the desire to obtain international recognition that it is still 
an important player on the world stage (although this recognition has not 
been as favorable as Russia apparently had expected). Furthermore, during 
the course of the last year, the Russian leadership has appealed to the 
United Nations to finance these peacekeeping operations. In other words. 
Russia wants the UN to give it the mandate and support for peacekeeping 
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in the fonuer Soviet Union; Ihese activities, Russia suggests, can be earried 
out under lhe auspices of lhe Commonwealth of Independent States, as an 
international organization. 
In addition to lhe factor of international recognition, olher possible 
motivations for Russia's interest in peacekeeping can also be identified. 
Certainly at least some forces within Russia are interested in using lhe 
guise of peaeekeeping to return to Moscow's control at least parts of what 
had been the Soviet Union. Second, it must be reeognized Ihat no one else 
in lhe international community has yet displayed a willingness to assume 
this responsibility in lhe FSU, wich further reinforces Russian attitudes 
Ihat this area represenls its legitimate sphere of interest. Third, given lhe lack 
of adequate border protection between Russia and many of Ihese states 
and lhe relative elose proximity of these conflicts to Russian terrilory, 
!here are elearly concerns aboul the possible spill-over effecls from Ihese 
eonfiiels into Russia if Ihey are no! contained. Finally, lhe fact Ihat 2S 
million Russians live oulside lhe borders of lhe Russian Federation provi-
des lhe leadership wilh anolher motivation for playing an active role in 
peaeekeeping: protecling its diaspora. 
The challenge for the Westem community of nations lies in finding 
a balance between, on lhe one hand. recognizing Ihal Russia does have a legi-
timate righl to be concerned aboul areas of instabilily on and near ils bor-
ders and, on lhe olher hand, nol allowing it to have a completely free hand 
to do whatever it pleases withoul risking inlernational reaelion. 
Susan Clark 
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